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RESPECTING CORPSES: THE ETHICS OF GRAVE RE-USE 
 
Julie Rugg, Cemetery Research Group, University of York 
Stephen Holland, Department of Philosophy, University of York 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper argues that grave re-use cannot be ethically evaluated simply by adverting to 
cognate issues, such as archeological and medical ethics, since grave re-use comprises a very 
specific type of disturbance. Whilst there is no general ethical prohibition against disturbing 
the dead, a more detailed analysis is required in the case of (QJOLVK9LFWRULDQµSHUSHWXLW\
JUDYHV¶. It is argued that, even granted that posthumous harms exist, on a proper 
understanding of what motivated purchase of perpetuity graves their re-use does not 
constitute a prohibitive posthumous harm. Objections to grave re-use on the grounds of the 
wellbeing of the living are then considered. Repugnance towards grave re-use is grounded in 
solicitous attitudes towards the dead and ontological anxiety about the fate of our own and 
RXUORYHGRQH¶VERGLHV. Nonetheless, repugnance should not be a weighty consideration in the 
policy debate. Finally, major pragmatic considerations in favour of grave re-use are 
reiterated. In sum, arguments against grave re-use are weak, and pragmatic arguments for 
grave re-use are strong, so re-using graves is ethically permissible. 
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RESPECTING CORPSES: THE ETHICS OF GRAVE RE-USE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Grave re-use: motivations and methods 
Shortage of burial space is a pressing issue in many jurisdictions. The problem arises in 
countries with expanding urban settlements and high population density, and cultural 
preferences which preclude cremation or dictate that burial is restricted to one interment per 
grave. For example, news stories have recently emerged about shortage of burial space in 
Hong Kong and New York, China, Jamaica and Namibia (Biegelsen 2012; Coutts et al. 2011; 
Gilpin 2014; Nuhuhe 2014). Grave re-use has been proposed to achieve sustainable and 
affordable municipal burial provision and extend the working capacity of cemeteries. 
Reception of the proposal is mixed. In South Africa, for example, new cemetery regulations 
have recently been introduced to permit grave re-use despite public opposition (Terra Daily 
2010). In other, particularly Anglophone, countries there is a cultural presumption against 
some systems of regular grave re-use. 
To help focus the discussion, the situation in England is taken as a case study.1  Systems of 
grave re-use have been in place in cemeteries throughout Continental Europe since the 
eighteenth century, in part as result of the diffusion of scientific principles based on 
Enlightenment philosophy. Grave re-use in cemeteries has never successfully been 
established in England, despite early regulation encouraging its adoption (Rugg 2013). An 
acute shortage of burial space has developed, as evidenced by recent surveys in London, and 
across England more generally (Rugg and Pleace 2011; Strangwayes-Booth 2013). This is 
despite the fact that the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to embrace and adapt 
cremation technology; cremations began to exceed burials in the 1960s, and in 2014 followed 
75 per cent of deaths (Jupp 2006).2  The vast majority of burial places in England fall into 
                                                   
1
 Although much of the ensuing discussion focuses on England, as already stated, shortage of 
burial space and grave re-use are issues in many other countries. Some of the arguments in 
this paper can be directly applied to other jurisdictions, others can be adapted to suit other 
contexts or, at least, the sort of considerations discussed can be raised elsewhere. But of 
course policy evaluations must be context-specific and culturally sensitive, and it might be 
that some of the discussion in this paper is too Anglo-centric to be applied directly to other 
jurisdictions. 
2
 See http://www.cremation.org.uk/ for regularly updated statistics.  
3 
 
one of two categories (Rugg 2000). Churchyards are consecrated areas owned by the Church 
of England and governed by ecclesiastical law. These are not the focus of our discussion 
because the re-use of churchyard graves is long-established, legally permitted under Church 
law and routinely performed. Our focus is on the second sort of burial space, namely, the 
numerous municipal cemeteries created since the mid-nineteenth century. Regarding these, 
there is a further distinction: municipal cemeteries contain both unconsecrated burial space 
subject to civic law and ± in the vast majority of cases ± consecrated burial space which is 
under the control of the Church of England and governed by ecclesiastical law. 
Unconsecrated burial space in municipal cemeteries is under discussion here. 
The main relevant legislation is the Burial Act 1857, parts of which are still in force. The 
legislation was originally intended to allow graves to be re-used after a specified time period 
but, since the 1930s, it has been interpreted as prohibiting systematic grave re-use (Rugg 
2013). According to the Act, it is illegal to remove interred human remains without specific 
licence from the relevant government department. Originally, this measure was taken largely 
in response to concern that, without prohibitive regulation, bodies might be removed from 
cemeteries, for example by a family member in disagreement over where a body was to be 
buried (Cunningham Glen 1858). At the time of writing, the relevant government department 
is the Ministry of Justice, which has so far refused to issue any licences permitting re-use of 
graves in the unconsecrated part of municipal cemeteries, though successive Ministers have 
VWDWHGWKDWWKHLVVXHLVµXQGHUUHYLHZ¶3  The upshot is that municipal cemeteries ± the 
principal source of burial space in England ± are unsustainable.  
Graves could be re-used in various ways. For example, existing cemeteries could be razed, 
human remains being removed, reduced to dust through a mass cremation process, and then 
strewn, or disposed of by being placed in a large communal burial pit. Such extreme options 
are not considered here because they are unlikely to gain ministerial or public support. The 
proposal under review KDVEHHQWHUPHGWKHµOLIWDQGGHHSHQ¶PHWKRGZKLFKIDFLOLWDWHVUH-use 
on a grave-by-grave basis and is favoured by the burial industry. The vast majority of graves 
contains more than one body, with coffins located one above the other, separated by six 
inches of earth between each, and at least two feet of earth above the final interment. For 
example, where a grave is to contain two bodies, the grave is dug to seven feet, the first 
                                                   
3
 See http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04060/reuse-of-graves. Licences 
permitting disturbance of human remains are often granted for reasons other than grave re-
use, such as to facilitate forensic investigation. 
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coffin is interred and the grave backfilled; when the second interment takes place, the grave is 
re-opened to the depth of six inches of earth above the original interment. Hence, the second 
interment does not disturb the first. The process can be repeated for more interments 
providing the first burial takes place at sufficient depth. 8VLQJWKHµOLIWDQGGHHSHQ¶PHWKRG
the grave would be excavated to double or single depth and any remains found within would 
be placed in a container and reburied at the bottom of the grave, leaving space for new 
interments. Re-use would take place only after sufficient time had elapsed for the contents of 
the grave to be in a state of advanced decomposition such that any remains comprise, at most, 
scant fragments of bone and coffin material.4 
The proposal to deal with the shortage of burial by reusing graves creates an ethical dilemma. 
On the one hand, there is a strong pragmatic justification for re-using graves: the constant 
need to find new land for interment provides impetus towards the policy; and grave re-use 
would help to avoid burial fees becoming unaffordably high due to scarcity of space. On the 
other hand, there are strong ethical misgivings based on wanting the dead to rest in peace, and 
reluctance to disturb the dead to make way for new burials. Hence, a wide-scale public 
RSLQLRQVXUYH\ZKLFKLQFOXGHGRYHUUHVSRQGHQWVFRQFOXGHGWKDWµWKHUH-use of graves is 
a topic to which people respond in different ways depending on the information with which 
WKH\DUHSURYLGHG¶'DYLHVDQG6KDZ 
 
Cognate debates: archeological and medical ethics   
A strategy to deal with this dilemma is to appeal to other more advanced debates about the 
ethics of our treatment of the dead. For example, there are sizeable bodies of literature on the 
ethics of archaeological research (Bahn 1984; Scarre and Scarre 2006) and the use of 
cadaveric material for medical purposes (Chadwick 1994; Gareth Jones (2000). These seem 
cognate to the issue of grave re-use. In particular, re-using graves, like archeological 
research, disturbs the dead; and the right to bodily integrity, which is central to the medical 
ethics of the use of cadavers ± principally as sources of transplant organs and tissue for 
experimentation ± seems pertinent to grave re-use.  
                                                   
4
 Decomposition rates vary, making it difficult accurately to anticipate the state of interred 
remains; nonetheless, the policy in question would only apply to remains that had clearly had 
VXIILFLHQWWLPHWRQDWXUDOO\GHFRPSRVHµ5HPDLQVPXVWEHLQVNHOHWDOIRUPRQO\± they must 
not be offensive in any way; as with cremation we do not want to disturb remains until there 
LVQRKXPDQWLVVXHUHPDLQLQJ¶+XVVHLQ. As a rule of thumb, re-use would be 
permitted only after a period of at least seventy years since the last interment. 
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But this strategy will not work because of relevant dissimilarities between these debates. For 
example, archeological ethics generally centres on the long-dead, the appropriation of the 
remains of subjugated peoples, pre-historic and indigenous cultures and removal from sacred 
sites. Likewise, in medical ethics the therapeutic rationale for using body parts ± to support 
medical research or save lives by transplanting organs ± is typically pitted against issues such 
as consent and commodification; and religious requirements to maintain bodily integrity 
entailing that retention of cadaveric tissue or organs has eschatological significance. As we 
go on to argue more fully below, such features are not relevant to the policy of grave re-use 
under consideration so the strategy of importing conclusions from debates in archeological 
and medical ethics will not work. Nonetheless, in the following discussion it will be useful to 
contrast grave re-use with the uses we make of the dead for archaeological and medical 
reasons. 
Here, a different strategy is adopted to evaluate the policy of grave re-use. Objections to 
grave re-use are presented and analysed in detail. The first objection, considered in the next 
section, is based on the general ethical prohibition against disturbing the dead. An illustrative 
case study is discussed, namely, English 9LFWRULDQµSHUSHWXLW\JUDYHV¶. It is argued that, even 
granted the existence of posthumous harms, the re-use of these particular sorts of graves 
would not create a prohibitive posthumous harm. Then, in the following section, objections to 
grave re-use based on the wellbeing of the living are considered. Intuitive repugnance 
towards grave re-use is explained in terms of solicitous attitudes and behavior towards the 
dead. Nonetheless, intuitive repugnance should not be a weighty consideration in the policy 
debate. In the last section major pragmatic considerations in favour of grave re-use are 
reiterated: notably, the policy will ensure the sustainability of cemeteries and affordability of 
burial space. It is concluded that, since arguments against grave re-use are weak, and 
pragmatic arguments for grave re-use are strong, re-using graves should be allowed; in 
particular, legislative change should be made permitting reusing municipal English graves. 
 
DISTURBING THE DEAD 
General moral prohibition against disturbing the dead 
The first objection to grave re-use to consider is based on the moral prohibition against 
GLVWXUELQJWKHGHDGZKRVKRXOGEHOHIWWRµUHVWLQSHDFH¶. There is intuitive support for this. 
But there cannot be a universal or absolute prohibition because there are some circumstances 
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in which disturbing the dead is generally considered to be a good thing, such as respectful re-
interment following the discovery of victims of atrocities in mass graves, or the exhumation 
of soldiers from battlefields and their re-interment in Commonwealth War Graves (Ferrándiz 
2006). This suggests a more detailed analysis is required, a more exact account of what 
makes some disturbances of the dead morally permissible, and some objectionable. 
It is useful to begin by recalling from the Introduction, above, the contrasting cases of 
disturbing the dead for archaeological and medical purposes. What makes disturbing the dead 
in archaeological research dubious are features such as the appropriation of human remains 
from sacred sites. This includes removing a body from a sacred place of interment to be 
stored indefinitely in a non-sacred location, and bodily disarticulation due to the process of 
excavation ± as when only part of a body is removed ± or due to the handling of the remains. 
Likewise, in the medical case bodies and body parts may be treated with little respect due to 
the laboratory setting, including inappropriate storage and disposal of human tissue as waste. 
As argued in the Introduction, such features make the disturbance of the dead for 
archaeological and medical purposes ethically dubious but they are irrelevant to the policy 
under consideration. The re-XVHRIPXQLFLSDOJUDYHVE\WKHµOLIWDQGGHHSHQ¶PHWKRGFOHDUO\
does not entail appropriation, and there is no intent to remove the body from the interment 
site, or from a sacred to a non-sacred place. There is no equivalent to the de-humanizing 
effect of treating bodies in a laboratory setting. Rather, the proposal in question is to re-use 
graves that contained a body which is now in such an advanced state of decomposition that 
little more than fragmentary bone exists. Placing those remains at the bottom of the grave in 
which they were buried does little more than accelerate well-advanced decomposition. 
Natural decomposition already disarticulates the body and no worse physical damage would 
occur. In fact, collecting remains and reburying them at the bottom of the grave might be 
thought of as a way of re-GHILQLQJRUµUHFRQQHFWLQJ¶DQDWXUDOO\GLVDUticulated individual.5 
                                                   
5
 Arguably, Christian theology would not preclude disarticulation or re-siting bodies anyway. 
7KHµVDFUHG¶QDWXUHRIWKHVRLOLQZKLFKSHRSOHDUHEXULHGFDUULHVQRVSLULWXDOEHQHILW. 
Consecration is a legal and ritual act, but Protestant denominations do not hold that this 
action has consequences for the fate of the soul. Certainly by the nineteenth century it was 
unlikely that grave re-use was regarded as having eschatological significance. England in the 
nineteenth century was overwhelmingly Christian, and comprised mostly Anglicans and 
Nonconformists (Snell and Ell 2000). These denominations did not carry a strong belief in 
whole-body resurrection, and no adverse spiritual outcome was anticipated in the event of 
bodily disarticulation. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that eschatological beliefs vary within 
and between religious frameworks. 
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6SHFLILFSURKLELWLRQWKH(QJOLVK9LFWRULDQµSHUSHWXLW\JUDYH¶ 
There is no general moral prohibition on disturbing the dead; and the features which make 
disturbances for archeological and medical purposes dubious do not pertain. Still, this does 
not entail that the grave re-use policy under consideration is a permissible disturbance of the 
dead because it might be morally objectionable to disturb the dead in order to re-use certain 
very specific sorts of graves. Here we consider a case study, namely, re-use in England of the 
nineteenth-century graves of our Victorian ancestors. 0DQ\RIWKHVHDUHµSHUSHWXLW\JUDYHV¶ 
iHIDPLO\JUDYHVSXUFKDVHGLQRUGHUWRJXDUDQWHHWKDWRQH¶VORYHG-ones would lie together in 
a grave that would remain µLQYLRODWH¶IRUDOOWLPH. Is re-use of this particular sort of grave 
morally impermissible?   
7RDGGUHVVWKLVWKHµSHUSHWXLW\JUDYH¶KDVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVDdistinctively nineteenth-
century innovation and placed in the context of nineteenth-century cultural sensibilities and 
social change. At that time, it was considered thatµLQYLRODELOLW\RIVHSXOFKUHLVRQHRIWKH
GHDUHVWDQGPRVWDQFLHQWULJKWVRIPDQNLQG¶ (Arnold in Gilbert v Buzzard (1820), 3 Phillim., 
341). This grounds their sense of a right to be buried with the assurance of non-disturbance 
forever. Fulfilling this right was harder to achieve than one might think. For one thing, 
although all parishioners had a right to burial in the churchyard, this was no guarantee that 
remains would lie undisturbed because, as mentioned above, churchyards ± and burial vaults 
within the church ± were subject to periodic re-use generation after generation. Indeed, some 
Anglo-Saxon churchyards still remain open to new burial despite little change to their 
boundaries in hundreds of years. In addition, from the end of the eighteenth century, urban 
expansion meant churchyards were increasingly unable to accommodate new interments 
whilst allowing sufficient time for earlier burials to decompose. Furthermore, by the 1810s, 
grave-robbing ± to meet the demand for cadaveric specimens driven by new anatomy schools 
± created a degree of moral panic (Richardson 1987).  
In response to such pressures, from the 1820s private cemetery companies began to finance 
new burial sites through the sale of shares, offering ± in contrast to the churchyard ± the 
possibility of interment in a family grave with a guarantee that the grave would remain 
µLQYLRODWH¶IRUDOOWLPH. 0RUHJHQHUDOO\µSHUSHWXLW\JUDYHV¶ZHUHPDGHDYDLODEOHWKURXJKWKH
course of the nineteenth century. A burial right to a perpetuity grave was purchased for a fee 
above the cost of interment alone. The purchaser did not thereby own the ground itself but 
did indefinitely retain control of the grave and could decide who would be buried in it. From 
the mid-QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\QHZµEXULDOERDUG¶FHPHWHULHVHVWDEOLVKHGXQGHUVWDWXWRU\
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regulations, were permitted to offer perpetuity graves; it remains the case that cemetery usage 
is split between sections of graves where control of the space rests with the owners of burial 
ULJKWVDQGDUHDVRIZKDWDUHJHQHUDOO\FDOOHGµSXEOLF¶RUµXQSXUFKDVHG¶JUDYHVWKDWFRQWDLQ
unrelated individuals unwilling or unable to pay for a burial right, and where the rights to 
burial remain with the burial authority.6 
An individual or family that made the decision to purchase a burial right in perpetuity 
evidently had a concern for the integrity of their remains. So disturbing nineteenth-century 
perpetuity graves could be considered detrimental to Victorian purchasers and their family by 
frustrating their desire to remain, or thwarting their interest in being, undisturbed. Might this 
cause a posthumous harm sufficiently serious to ground a moral imperative to leave these 
graves, at least, undisturbed?  If so, whilst there is no general prohibition against disturbing 
the dead, re-using this very specific sort of grave ± the sort which is central to a policy of 
grave re-use in England ± might be ethically impermissible. Evaluating this argument raises 
two questions: first, are there posthumous harms at all; second, if so, would the posthumous 
harm of reusing Victorian perpetuity graves be sufficiently serious to prohibit the policy? 
 
Posthumous harms 
Regarding the former question, one might argue that there are no posthumous harms so 
reusing perpetuity graves obviously does not constitute a posthumous harm sufficiently 
serious to rule out the policy. But this is too quick because there is a standard defence of 
posthumous harms in the philosophical literature, which goes as follows. First, it is natural to 
associate harms with felt experiences or mental states; for example, my hitting you on the 
nose harms you by causing you pain. This suggests that an action is harmful only if it changes 
WKHYLFWLP¶VH[SHULHQce. But a standard assumption in the philosophical literature on 
posthumous harms is that GHDWKPDUNVWKHHQGRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VH[LVWHQFH ± i.e., there is no 
µOLIHDIWHUGHDWK¶ ± so a decedent is no longer capable of any experience and, in turn, whatever 
happens after their death cannot harm them (Belshaw 2009: 128). Proponents of posthumous 
KDUPVUHVSRQGE\GHILQLQJµKDUP¶ZLGHO\WRDOORZWKDWKDUPVFDQLQYROYHQRQ-experienced 
states. For example, suppose harm is reduced wellbeing and wellbeing is defined as involving 
                                                   
6
 µ3DXSHU¶JUDYHVFRQVWLWXWHGDWKLUGW\SHRIEXULDO,WRIWHQUHPDLQHGSRVVLEOHIRU
µXQSXUFKDVHG¶JUDYHVWRKDYHVRPHNLQGRIPRQXPHQWDWLRQDQGDKLJKO\FRPSOH[TXLUNLQ
the legislation meant that an unpurchased grave could in some circumstances be reserved for 
the use of a single family, (Rugg 2013). 
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more than just mental states. If someone is systematically betrayed by their closest friend but 
never finds out, the betrayal makes no difference to their experience; still, their wellbeing is 
reduced so the betrayal harms them. Since a change in experience is not necessary for harm 
to occur, posthumous harms cannot be ruled out on the grounds that nothing makes a 
GLIIHUHQFHWRDGHFHGHQW¶VPHQWDOVWDWHV 
This ushers in another objection to posthumous harms: who is the subject of the harm?  
Posthumous harms are not simply unexperienced, as in the case RIEHLQJEHWUD\HGE\RQH¶V
closest friend; rather, the putative subject of the harm does not exist post-mortem. Could the 
subject of harm exist ante-mortem?  But then the event which causes the harm must occur 
DIWHUWKHVXEMHFWLVKDUPHGZKLFKUHTXLUHVµEDFNZDUGVFDXVDWLRQ¶± the harming event occurs 
after its effect ± which is impossible (or, at least, prohibitively philosophically problematic). 
Proponents of posthumous harms meet this objection by identifying the ante-mortem person 
as the subject of harm and avoiding backwards causation by invoking the following 
distinction. What is true of someone can depend on intrinsic changes; for example, if I grow 
WZRLQFKHVWKHQµ,DPVL[IHHWWDOO¶ZDVIDOse, but is now true, of me. But what is true of a 
person can depend not on changes intrinsic to them, but on changes elsewhere in the world. 
6XSSRVHP\KHLJKWVWD\VWKHVDPHEXW7RPJURZVWZRLQFKHVµ,DPVKRUWHUWKDQ7RP¶ZDV
false, but is now true, of me. The philosophical term for the latter sort of change is 
µ&DPEULGJHFKDQJH¶. If having desires frustrated or interests thwarted amounts to harms, and 
SRVWKXPRXVDFWLRQVFDQPDNHµ$¶VGHVLUHVLQWHUHVWVDUHIUXVWUDWHGWKZDUWHG¶WUXHWKHQ
posthumous harms are possible: the person of whom it is true is the ante-mortem person; this 
does not require any intrinsic change (such as changes to their experience) and its being true 
is not a matter of cause and effect (the change is merely logical) so backwards causation is 
avoided. 
But this argument for posthumous harms introduces another problem. When does the harm 
occur?  In light of the previous paragraph, the timing of harms must be tied to the ante-
mortem person. But then the available options are equally unattractive. One is to link the 
harm to the ante-PRUWHPSHUVRQ¶VDFTXLVLWLRQRIDGHVLUHLQWHUHVWWKDWZLOOEHSRVWKXPRXVO\
frustrated/thwarted. Suppose they acquire the desire/interest when they are fifty and retain it 
for the rest of their life; this entails they are in a harmed state from age fifty onwards, which 
is very odd. Alternatives, such as that their harmed state is timeless ± i.e., they are in a state 
of being harmed by the relevant posthumous actions and events at all points in time ± are 
even odder. Wilkinson (2011: 40) illustrates how proponents of posthumous harms solve this 
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timing problem: the ante-mortem person is harmed when the posthumous harming event 
takes place; the air of paradox disappears once we recall that the relevant change is merely 
logical ± i.e., a change in which propositions are true of the ante-mortem person ± as opposed 
to a real change involving backwards causation.7   
A number of commentators subscribe to this defence of posthumous harms but there is no 
philosophical consensus on the matter and at least one of the present authors is unconvinced 
by it and remains skeptical about posthumous harms.8  Nonetheless, this standard defence of 
posthumous harms, or some equivalent, is taken here to succeed. This is for dialectical 
purposes, i.e. in order to argue that, even granted that posthumous harms exist, re-using 
graves does not constitute harm to Victorian purchasers of perpetuity graves serious enough 
to prohibit the policy. Presented thus, the argument for grave re-use does not require the 
contentious claim that there are no posthumous harms.  
 
The harm of re-using a Victorian perpetuity grave 
To explain why re-using perpetuity graves does not create a serious posthumous harm 
requires revisiting the motivations of nineteenth-century purchasers. 7KH9LFWRULDQ¶VGHVLUH
for, or interest in, perpetuity burial is rather less straightforward than one might imagine. The 
obvious thought is that perpetuity graves were intended to be permanently inviolable, but 
doubts about tKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHQRWLRQRIEXULDOµLQSHUSHWXLW\¶ZHUHUDLVHGHYHQLQWKH
nineteenth century. For example, in 1820, John Gilbert brought a case against John Buzzard 
DQG:LOOLDP%R\HUFKXUFKZDUGHQVRI6W$QGUHZ¶V+ROERUQEDVHGRQWKHLUUHIXVDOWRDOORZ 
the burial of his wife in an iron coffin. In making his judgement on the case, Lord Stowell 
DVVHUWHGWKDWµ³PDQ´DQG³IRUHYHU´ are terms quite incompatible in any state of his existence, 
GHDGRUDOLYHLQWKLVZRUOG¶. Consequently,  
with reference to men, the domus aeterna is a mere flourish of rhetoric. The process of 
nature will resolve them into an intimate mixture with their kindred earth, and will 
                                                   
7
 Wilkinson is aware that this move threatens to make posthumous harms trivial; after all, 
how important can merely logical changes be?  But he points out that the significance of a 
change does not depend on how it comes about; harms due to real causal changes can be 
minor, whereas some harms of the sort described as logical can be very serious. 
8
 For classic discussions of posthumous harms, see Feinberg (1984); Levenbook (1984); 
Pitcher (1984); Fischer (2001). More recent advocates of posthumous harms include 
Wilkinson (2002), (2011); Scarre  (2012); Papineau (2012). For a more sceptical treatment, 
see Belshaw (2009). 
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IXUQLVKDSODFHRIUHSRVHIRURWKHURFFXSDQWVRIWKHJUDYHLQVXFFHVVLRQ«7KHFRPPRQ
cemetery is not res unius aetatis, the exclusive property of one generation now 
departed; but is likewise the common property of the living, and of generations yet 
unborn, and subject only to temporary accommodation (Lord Stowell in Gilbert v 
Buzzard (1829) 3 Phillim., 357) 
$VWKLVLQGLFDWHVHYHQLQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKHLGHDWKDWDEXULDOPLJKWEHJHQXLQHO\µLQ
SHUSHWXLW\¶ZDVLQTXHVWLRQ. The natural decomposition of the body, and the claims of 
successive generations on the burial site, were clearly recognized; and the notion of 
SHUSHWXLW\ZDVWKRXJKWRIDVDµUKHWRULFDOIORXULVK¶QRWWREHFRQVWUXHGDVDUHDOLVWLFREMHFWLYH
by the purchaser of a burial right. 
If not perpetuity, then what was the motivation for purchasing perpetuity graves?  What 
desires or interests were being met?9  Evidently, perpetuity graves were purchased in order to 
ensure close control over what would happen to the body once interment had taken place. But 
this desire for control reflected a number of interrelated concerns with regard to the fate of 
the post-mortem body in the nineteenth century. Two seem particularly prominent. First, 
there was a fear that the body would be subject to disturbance too soon after interment had 
taken place, such that depredation of a corpse would take place in its fleshed and identifiable 
state. For example, by the end of the 1830s, the ghastly state of city churchyards, which were 
overwhelmed with mortal remains and where decomposing bodies were often open to public 
view, was considered scandalous (Walker 1839). Second, there was a concern that bodies 
ZRXOGEHLQWHUUHGµSURPLVFXRXVO\¶LQJUDYHVZLWKQRQ-family members. For example, within 
the overcrowded churchyard, mothers, sisters and daughters might lie between non-related 
adult males. 
In these circumstances, the purchase of a burial right in perpetuity is not motivated by the 
unrealistic desire for bodies to remain perpetually undisturbed. Rather, the important 
motivations are, first, for bodies to remain undisturbed whilst in their fleshed state and, 
second, to ensure that family members were interred together (Rugg 2013). 6WUDQJH¶V
study of working-class burial practice in cemeteries located in the North West of England in 
the late Victorian period supports this analysis. Strange reports that it was often the case that 
                                                   
9
 In contrast with our discussion, much of the debate about posthumous harms in the 
philosophical literature avoids this messy business of reconstructing the relevant ante-mortem 
GHVLUHVRULQWHUHVWVE\SRVLWLQJVFHQDULRVLQZKLFKWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶ZLVKHVDUHYHU\
straightforward, such as to have a book manuscript published or a business thrive, or that 
RQH¶VFKLOGUHQIORXULVKRUVSHFLILFLQIHOLcities remain undiscovered. 
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families who could afford only a common grave at times of limited income would, when 
finances allowed, pay for disinterment and reburial of a family member in a private grave. 
This indicates a readiness to set aside any prohibition against disinterment in order to achieve 
a higher purpose, namely, to ensure that the family was buried together in the same plot. 
Given this reconstruction of their motivations, reusing Victorian perpetuity graves by 
HPSOR\LQJWKHµOLIWDQGGHHSHQ¶method would not frustrate the desires, or thwart the 
interests, of Victorian purchasers. First, grave re-use would not disturb occupants whilst in a 
fleshed state because sufficient time would have elapsed for remains to be no more than 
fragmentary bone. Second, family members would continue to be united in death because 
skeletal remains would stay within the grave in which they are discovered, albeit at a deeper 
depth. That subsequent interment would occupy space above them neither frustrates the 
desires nor thwarts the interests of the original occupants: there would be no precipitous re-
use of the grave to disinter recognisable and fleshed remains, and no promiscuous 
intermingling of familial and non-familial occupants. In sum, even if we grant that there are 
posthumous harms, reusing Victorian perpetuity graves would not constitute a posthumous 
harm to Victorian purchasers sufficiently serious to prohibit the policy. 
 
THE WELLBEING OF THE LIVING 
This section addresses whether grave re-use is objectionable because of its effects on the 
living. The basic argument is that people are concerned about how their bodies will be dealt 
with after death, and allowing grave reuse will cause anxiety.10  But this is deceptively simple 
and two things must be discussed to fully preseQWDQGDVVHVVWKHDUJXPHQWILUVWSHRSOH¶V
attitude towards the dead (which entails their attitude towards themselves when dead); 
second, how this attitude contributes to anxiety about the treatment of human remains. 
Attitudes towards the dead 
Of course, there is a very wide variety of culturally endorsed attitudes and behaviour towards 
death so we do not intend what follows to be a universal account; nonetheless, we suggest 
that attitudes and behaviour described here are widespread and discernible in various 
                                                   
10
 One might think grave re-use is objectionable because the bereaved would be upset by the 
disturbance of their loved ones. But, to reiterate, grave re-use would not occur until a period 
of at least seventy years, so the effect on the bereaved should be inconsiderable. Nonetheless, 
safeguards could be built into ethical and regulatory frameworks to avoid re-using graves in a 
way that would cause any distress to relatives. 
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cultures, and particularly pertinent to the proposed policy of re-using English graves. The 
distinction between the recently and long-term dead is vague in the philosophical sense that 
WKHUHDUHQRµEULJKWOLQHV¶ between them; rather, there is a temporal continuum from the 
recent to the long-term dead. At the former pole, solicitude for the material welfare of the 
recently deceased is apparent in ways in which people interact with, and behave around, the 
fresh corpse.11 For example, the faces of dead bodies are covered as soon as possible 
following accidents; corpses are not shown in a state of undress or posed in what might be 
considered an undignified fashion; and the newly dead bodies of identifiable individuals are 
not subject to public gaze. Exceptions prove the rule through contravention. Further along the 
temporal continuum, solicitude continues to be shown for some time after death.12  For 
example, the bereaved might locate a grave for a loved-one with a pleasant view (perhaps 
under a tree to provide a degree of shelter), worry that the grave is cold for the person who 
has died, and leave food and drink at the grave to benefit the deceased (Francis et al. 2005). 
Solicitous behavior of such sort imputes sentience to the dead, and implies that dead bodies 
are hyper-vulnerable, creating a moral obligation to advance a degree of care, an obligation 
PDGHJUHDWHUE\WKHGHFHGHQW¶VGHIHQVHOHVVQHVV. 
A response to features such as solicitude towards the dead, and a sense of their continued 
sentience and vulnerability, is that they are irrelevant to the issue at hand, for two reasons. 
First, grave re-use would take place after at least seventy years so, notwithstanding the 
vagueness of the temporal categories, the policy sits much further along the temporal 
continuum: the graves in question would contain only fragmented or decomposed human 
remains, not the recently deceased who elicit solicitude.13  Second, the attitudes and behavior 
toward the dead just described are internally inconsistent, as is much of behaviour relating to 
the dead body in the modern West (Tarlow 2011). Mourners who do not believe in life after 
death know that the corpse is insentient so no longer physically vulnerable; those who believe 
in life after death think the soul has departed. In neither case is solicitous behavior based on 
                                                   
11
 The ongoing debate over defining and determining death ± see, e.g. Belshaw (2009); 
Holland (2010) ± is not germane since the solicitude for the corpse we go on to describe is 
undertaken after death has taken place on any account. 
12
 *DUHWK-RQHVUHFRJQLVHVWKLVVROLFLWXGHDVDUHVSHFWIRUWKHµLQWULQVLFYDOXH¶RID
FDGDYHUTXRWLQJ0D\DVUHFRJQLVLQJWKDWµZKLOHDERG\UHWDLQVDUHFRJQLVDEOHIRUPHYHQLQ
GHDWKLWFRPPDQGVWKHUHVSHFWRILGHQWLW\¶ 
13
 µ7KHGHDG¶DUHQRWSHUFHLYHGDVDVWDWLFHQWLW\LQWKDWWKHLGHQWLW\RIWKHSHUVRQZKRKDV
died does not remain fixed; as time passes, relatives and acquaintances who knew the dead 
individual will themselves die; the vast majority of people who die will in time become 
forgotten. 
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the belief that the dead body really is sentient, or that a corpse will enjoy the view from the 
grave.  
The significance of repugnance 
However, this response might be too quick because, arguably, solicitous attitudes explain and 
ground repugnance at the prospect of certain sorts of actions towards the dead. In particular, 
such attitudes ground the intuition that disturbing the dead in order to re-use their graves is 
repellent and ethically suspect. The reaction to grave re-use rests on the ontological insecurity 
visited on the living, as they contemplate this threat to the solicitude of their own or their 
ORYHGRQH¶VVHQWLHQWYXOQHUDEOHFRUSVH. Reciprocity seems clearly related to attitudes and 
behaviour towards grave re-use, in that the best protection that we can afford our own dead 
self is the protection that we display to the newly dead. Negative responses to grave re-use ± 
that it is repugnant or ethically dubious ± FDQEHJURXQGHGLQWKHµWKHGLIILFXOW\Ln regarding 
WKHKXPDQERG\LQDQLPSDUWLDOUDWLRQDOZD\¶&KDGZLFN14   
But even if this succeeds in displaying and explaining repugnance at the prospect of grave re-
use, there is a further question as to the weight such attitudes should have in the policy 
debate. A way to argue for giving such intuitive responses weight in the debate contrasts the 
municipal cemetery with the English village churchyard. Grave re-use has taken place in 
churchyards since the Anglo-Saxon period, as successive generations have informally 
LQVWLWXWHGDµOLIWDQGGHHSHQ¶SURFHVV. In the ethical framework for this, individual bodily 
integrity is less important than respect afforded to the dead communally, united as they are 
through extended kinship ties. In effect, the whole of the churchyard becomes a single 
familial plot, controlled by the Church at parochial church council level through 
churchwardens elected from the congregation. By contrast, little trust obtains in the municipal 
setting because communal identity is less strongly articulated and degrees of direct 
democratic control have been weakened. In a context of generalised distrust of large-scale 
government institutions, we can no longer feel assured that our dead are safe in the cemetery. 
Hence, the prospect of grave re-use is disturbing; arguably, sufficiently so as to prohibit its 
introduction.  
This is a plausible line of thought and, as has been suggested, repugnance towards re-using 
graves is understandable and explicable, if not altogether rational. Nonetheless, great weight 
                                                   
14
 For a direct parallel to this line of thought see Kass (1992) who describes and explains our 
repugnance and, in turn, ethical qualms about uses of body parts to argue against a market in 
transplant organs (see also Kass 1997).  
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should not be attached to such attitudes and responses to grave re-use. There is a cumulative 
case against taking it overly seriously in the policy debate. As suggested above, our strongest 
intuitions and clearest behaviour pertains to the recently deceased whereas grave re-use 
would take place much further along the temporal continuum. Furthermore, distrust towards 
cemetery governance can be dealt with by careful regulation of grave re-use. And, as argued 
below, there are strong countervailing reasons for allowing graves to be re-used. In addition, 
one might argue that anxiety about the appropriate treatment of the newly dead might count 
in favour of a policy of re-use: after all, how else are those who want to be buried to get their 
wishes respected, given the shortage of burial space?   
In sum, the sensibilities of the living do not present a strong argument against a policy of 
grave re-use. Nonetheless, repugnance of the sort explicated above and, in turn, ethical 
disquiet, are unlikely to disappear.15  This is one reason for carefully developed and 
rigorously enforced regulation of a policy of grave re-use, including ethical protocols and 
guidelines similar to those governing other activities which disturb the dead, such as 
archaeological research and medical practice. This is required for other reasons. The slippery 
slope objection to grave re-use is that, if this step is taken, graves of the past will be raided 
with impunity. Although this is a somewhat implausible objection to the policy, it confirms 
the need for strong regulation. For example, grave re-use is permissible only in certain 
tightly-defined circumstances where there is a guarantee that fleshed remains are not 
disturbed, that the process is not subject to public gaze, and that all human remains stay 
within the grave in which they were buried. Families should be advised that a lift and deepen 
process had taken place in a particular grave, and would not be obliged to take that grave. It 
may also be the case that additional safeguards should be in place to heighten the degree of 
community engagement and control; for example, through ensuring that individual objections 
to the re-use of a particular grave be honoured, and a steering group be convened to agree 
local and site-specific protocols. 
 
 
 
                                                   
15
 Arguably, extended delay in the production of ministerial guidance in this area might be 
taken to suggest that, although the permissibility and policy of grave re-use ought to be 
addressed through philosophical debate, irrational intuition continues to hold a good deal of 
sway. Of course, political expediency is likely to be a factor too. 
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PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION FOR GRAVE RE-USE 
The previous two sections found arguments against grave re-use based on disturbing the dead 
and the wellbeing of the living to be uncompelling. This section reiterates the main 
arguments in favour of grave re-use, which are essentially pragmatic. First, the policy will 
ensure the sustainability of cemeteries. This is a major consideration because the need to find 
new land for interment is a pressing issue for local authorities. There are basic economic 
exigencies in play. Cemeteries are largely financially unsustainable and so generally require 
subsidy (Rugg, forthcoming). At the same time the complexities of burial law mean that no 
local authority is obliged to provide burial space, so could decide to close its existing sites 
and withdraw altogether from cemetery provision. Local authorities are unlikely to take this 
step; for the majority, options are limited to making better use of existing space within 
cemeteries, so that existing graves are not disturbed. For example, many London boroughs 
have already taken steps to bury between existing graves, along pathways, and in land 
originally set aside for car parking or floral display. In some instances, additional soil has 
been brought in to raise the level of the site to allow for burial above existing graves. But 
these policies ± WHUPHGµFUDPPLQJ¶E\RQHSODQQLQJRIILFLDO± do not make the space any less 
finite, and cannot provide a long-term solution to the problem (Halcrow Fox 1997).  
The second pragmatic consideration is that a policy of grave re-use will help ensure the 
affordability of burial space. This is clearly connected to the previous point: the greater the 
shortage of burial space, the scarcer this resource, with the inevitable economic result of price 
increases. This is a major consideration because funeral poverty is a substantial issue for 
many people. In particular, the cost of burial itself currently constitutes a large proportion of 
any funeral bill (Woodthorpe 2012). In itself, this consideration suggests that grave re-use is 
not only permissible but, arguably, an ethical imperative.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the UK, there are in principle strong moral objections to the undue disturbance of bodies. 
The notion of disturbing a grave for the purpose of re-using that grave for further burial 
carries particular resonance with regard to the sanctity of the grave and a desire to let the 
GHDGµUHVWLQSHDFH¶7KLVSDSHUKDVDGGUHVVHGWKHHWKLFDOGLPHQVLRQVRf the issue, and found 
that ethical debates that relate to ostensibly associated practices ± attached to archaeological 
study, or the use of cadavers in medical research ± do not pertain to the issue of grave re-use 
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largely because the proposed treatment of the body does not include removal from its original 
burial site. Ethical issues then pertain to particular cases, and this paper has reviewed the 
proposal to re-use English Victorian perpetuity graves in which rights were purchased and 
used in the nineteenth century. This specificity allows for interrogation of the concept of 
µSHUSHWXLW\¶LQDSDUWLFXODUKLVWRULFDQGFXOWXUDOFRQWH[WDQGWKHXQGHUO\LQJLQWHQWRI
individuals taking this option. We argue that perpetuity burial was a favoured option not 
becDXVHRIDGHVLUHWRUHVWLQSHDFHµIRUDOOWLPH¶EXWEHFDXVHLWFRXOGJXDUDQWHHWKDWDIDPLO\
would be buried together. A legal judgement from the period found that perpetuity should be 
UHJDUGHGDVPRUHRIDµUKHWRULFDOIORXULVK¶WKDQDUHDOL]DEOHLQWHQWEven where a purchaser 
might believe themselves to be buying interment for all eternity, there are philosophical 
problems in defining any posthumous harm that might be visited on such a purchaser whose 
wishes are thwarted. 
The paper then considered the possible harms to the living that might follow the introduction 
of a system of grave re-use. These harms stemmed from the threat to the dead body inherent 
in the concept of grave re-use and which runs counter to a desire to protect the corpse. 
+RZHYHUWKLVVROLFLWXGHWHQGVWREHGLUHFWHGPRVWVWURQJO\WRWKHERG\LQLWVµQHDU-DOLYH¶
identifiable and fleshed state. The passage of time reduces the intensity of this solicitude 
which is generally absent entirely where human remains have decomposed to the state of 
fragmentary bone and where identity is no longer known. Solicitude can be assured by 
achieving control over the fate of the body. This control is readily exercised through the more 
immediately democratic governance of village churchyards, where grave re-use is 
commonplace. Within the municipal cemetery context, the prospect of immediate control of 
the incidence of re-use and its regulation is absent. There is, simply, a distrust that re-use will 
be conducted in an ethical fashion, with due regard to sensitivities on the period of time left 
before re-use is undertaken, and a guarantee that any distinterred remains will not be removed 
RUµORVW¶7KHSDSHUFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHVHIHDUVPD\EHDOOD\HGWKURXJKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI
appropriately strong regulations or protocols defining the re-use process. Even where those 
protocols may be set in place, grave re-use will remain an uncomfortable concept for some 
individuals. Nevertheless, ethical arguments against the prospect of grave re-use are not 
compelling, and the more pragmatic considerations in favour of the policy are strong. Hence, 
this paper concludes that it is ethically acceptable for Victorian perpetuity graves to be re-
used to tackle the problem of shortage of burial space in England.
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